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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA
BRIEF FOR RESPONDENT
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Florida Supreme Court is reported at Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 34 
(Fla. 2011). The opinion of the Florida Court of Appeals is reported at 9 So. 3d 1 (Fla. App. 3 
Dist. 2008).
^ JURISDICTION
The jurisdiction of this court is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1988).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The first issue of whether a sniff search constitutes an unreasonable search in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment requires a two-part analysis. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 







privacy in the object challenged by the search. Id This inquiry is a question of fact and is 
subject to review under the clear error standard. United States v. McKennon. 814 F.2d 1539, 
1542-43 (11th Cir. 1987) (citing United States v. Edmondson. 791 F.2d 1512, 1514 (11th Cir.
1986)). The second part of the Katz test inquires as to whether society is willing to recognize the 
defendant’s expectation of privacy as reasonable. Katz. 389 U.S. at 360. That inquiry is a 
question of law and is subject to a de novo review. McKennon. 814 F.2d at 1543 (citing 
California v. Ciraolo. 476 U.S. 207, 211-214 (1986)).
The second issue of whether a sniff search requires probable cause or reasonable 
suspicion is a question of law subject to de novo review. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 
691 (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Procedural History
On January 12, 2007, Prosecutors for Miami-Dade County in Florida charged Joelis 
Jardines with one count of cannabis trafficking and one count of grand theft in the third degree. 
(J.A. 2.) On June 5, 2007, Jardines filed a motion to suppress all evidence found at his home and 
all subsequent statements he made. (J.A. 19.) Jardines argued: (1) that detectives investigating 
his case did not possess the requisite probable cause necessary to conduct a search of his home;
(2) that the good faith exception to the warrant requirement was not applicable in this case; and
(3) that the evidence found at Jardines’ home and his subsequent statements were fruit of the 
poisonous tree. (J.A. 16-19.) Judge William Thomas granted Jardines’ motion on June 13,
2007, relying on State v. Rabb. 920 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006), long standing Florida state 
law holding the use of drug detection dogs at homes to be a Fourth Amendment search. (J.A.
134, 140-41.) Judge Thomas further held that the anonymous tip implicating Jardines was not
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corroborated and the surveillance conducted by detectives at his home was insufficient to 
establish the probable cause necessary to obtain a search warrant for his home. (J.A. 134-37.) 
While prosecutors had argued that investigators detected the smell of marijuana outside his 
home, Judge Thomas held that the drug detection dog indicated the presence of marijuana in the 
home first which tainted any detection by investigators on the scene. (J.A. 135.)
The State of Florida appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal of Florida for the Third 
District. State v. Jardines. 9 So. 3d 1, 1 (Fla. App. 3 Dist. 2008). In a departure from 
longstanding Florida case law, the appellate court held; (1) that the use of a highly-trained drug 
detection dog at Jardines’ home was not a search; (2) that the presence of investigators at 
Jardines’ door did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights; (3) that there was sufficient 
evidence for probable cause for the search warrant; and (4) that absent probable cause, the 
evidence found in Jardines’ home would be admissible through the inevitable discovery doctrine. 
Id at 1-15.
Jardines appealed the decision to the Florida Supreme Court. Jardines v. State, 73 So. 3d 
34, 34 (Fla. 2011). The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in its departure from 
Florida V. Rabb. 549 U.S. 1052 (2006). The Court held that a sniff search is a Fourth 
Amendment search and that probable cause is the evidentiary standard necessary for a sniff 
search. Jardines. 73 So. 3d at 35-37. Furthermore, the court held that because investigators did 
not have probable cause for the sniff search, the evidence was not lawfully obtained. Id at 54. 
Absent the unlawfully obtained sniff search evidence, detectives did not have sufficient evidence 
to establish the probable cause necessary for the search warrant of Jardines’ home. Id at 54-55.
The State of Florida filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which this Court granted on 
January 6, 2012. (J.A. 144.) The questions certified by this Court are; (1) whether a dog sniff at
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the front door of a suspected grow house by a trained drug detection dog is a Fourth Amendment 
search; and (2) whether a dog sniff of the air outside a private residence constitutes a minimally 
invasive search requiring less than probable cause. (J.A. 144.)
Statement of the Facts
On Friday, November 3, 2006, an anonymous crime stoppers caller reported to police that 
marijuana was being grown at Jardines’ residence. (J.A. 8.) Jardines’ home address is 13005 
S.W. 257th Terrace. (J.A. 3.) On the morning of Tuesday, December 5, 2006, Detective Bartelt, 
his drug detection dog, and Detective Pedraja set up a perimeter around the residence to survey 
the area. (J.A. 32.) The Detectives conducted a fifteen minute surveillance of Jardines’ home. 
(J.A. 32.) During the surveillance, Detective Pedraja observed that the home’s blinds were 
closed, the air conditioner was running continuously and that there was no traffic to or from the 
residence. (J.A. 38.) Following their survey. Detective Bartelt and his canine approached the 
front door to conduct a sniff search. (J.A. 50.) Detective Pedraja waited behind Detective 
Bartelt. (J.A. 35.) As Detective Bartelt and the canine approached Jardines’ residence, the 
canine energetically pulled, fiilly extending the six foot leash and drawing Detective Bartelt 
toward the door. (J.A. 49.)
Upon reaching the fi’ont door, the canine began bracketing, indicating that he had 
detected the odor of one or more of the controlled substances he is trained to detect. (J.A. 52.) 
Detective Bartelt reported that he did not smell marijuana, but did detect the smell of moth balls. 
(J.A. 55.) Detective Bartelt indicated to Detective Pedraja that the canine gave a positive alert 
for the odor of narcotics. (J.A. 53.) Detective Pedraja then approached and stated that he 
smelled marijuana at the front door. (J.A. 36.)
Detective Pedraja prepared a search warrant using the information obtained from the 
canine sniff, as well as the facts that the air conditioner was running, the blinds were closed, and 
the anonymous crime stoppers tip. (J.A. 110.) Judge George Sarduy for the Eleventh Judicial 
Circuit of Florida then signed the search warrant. (J.A. 110.)
About an hour later, members of the Miami-Dade Police Department Narcotics Bureau 
and DEA Agents set up a perimeter in preparation to execute the warrant. (J.A. 17.) The agents 
executed the search warrant by gaining entry into the residence through the front door. (J.A. 17.) 
According to the DEA report, Jardines exited the residence through the rear sliding glass door 
and was then detained by Special Agent Wilson. (J.A. 17.) Agents found a marijuana lab in the 
southwest comer of the residence during the course of the search. (J.A. 17.) Detective Pedraja 
subsequently interviewed Jardines, who confessed both orally and in a written statement. (J.A. 
17.) Based on the obtained evidence and confession, Jardines was charged with Trafficking in 
Cannabis, a first degree felony, and Grand Theft in the third degree. (J.A. 17.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Florida Supreme Court’s decision should be upheld. The use of a drug detection dog 
at the front door of a private residence to reveal details within the home which the officer could 
not otherwise obtain without going into the constitutionally protected area constitutes a Fourth 
Amendment search. Under this Court’s test in Katz. Jardines manifested a subjective 
expectation of privacy in his home by closing his blinds, windows, and doors. This Court’s 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence demonstrates that society recognizes a citizen’s right to retreat 
into their home and be free from government intrusion. Government activity that seeks to reveal 
the intimate details within the home which an individual seeks to keep private is an unreasonable 
search under the Fourth Amendment.
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This Court’s decisions holding that dog sniff searches are permissible in public places are 
not applicable to the home because citizens may reasonably expect to be free from government 
intrusions in their home, but have less of an expectation when in public. Each of the cases this 
Court upheld involved situations where the government had a traditional interest in regulating 
public safety and do not warrant extension where citizens’ reasonable expectations of privacy are 
at their highest.
The Fourth Amendment search of Jardines’ home required probable cause. A Fourth 
Amendment search presumptively carries the evidentiary burden of probable cause. Exceptions 
to the general rule requiring probable cause for searches first requires that a court find that 
“special needs” necessitate a lower evidentiary standard, such as a need to protect the public or 
police officers. If such “special needs” exist, then the court must balance the public and 
government interests in conducting the search against the individual’s expectation of privacy in 
the contents of the search and the level of intrusion. The Court looks first to the government 
interests in the search and then weighs those interests against the invasiveness of the search.
Here, the search of Jardines’ home does not fit within the exception to the general rule. The 
search was not in conformity with a “special need” of law enforcement, nor did the minimal 
government interests outweigh the significant presumption that Jardines has an expectation of 
privacy in his home and the significant invasiveness of a search of that location. Because the 
detectives did not possess the requisite probable cause to search his home, this Court should 
uphold the Florida Supreme Court’s decision.
6
ARGUMENT
1. THE USE OF A DRUG DETECTION DOG AT A CITIZEN’S FRONT PORCH TO
REVEAL INTIMATE DETAILS WITHIN THE HOME IS A FOURTH AMENDMENT
SEARCH REQUIRING PROBABLE CAUSE.
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const, amend. IV (emphasis added). The search of 
Jardines’ home involved a drug detection dog coming onto his front porch and sniffing under his 
front door to detect objects within the home. (J.A. 1.)
In determining whether a search has occurred, this Court has utilized the test set out in 
Katz V. United States. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967), where the court determines (1) whether a 
person has exhibited a subjective expectation of privacy and (2) whether that expectation is one 
that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Application of the Fourth Amendment 
depends on whether the person invoking its protection can claim a “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” that has been invaded by government action. Id
A. Jardines Exhibited His Subjective Expectation of Privacy in His Home by Closing 
the Blinds. Windows, and Doors.
The first prong of Katz looks to the affirmative conduct persons undertake to protect their 
privacy. United States v. Knotts. 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983). Where the individual has shown 
that “he seeks to preserve [something] as private” it is inferred that the person has a subjective 
expectation of privacy. Id.
For example, in California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986), Ciraolo constructed a 
ten foot fence to shield his marijuana growing operation from neighbors and police. In holding 
that the construction of a ten foot fence was sufficient to demonstrate that Ciraolo manifested an
7
expectation of privacy in his backyard, this Court stated that “[c]learly-and understandably- 
respondent has met the test of manifesting his own subjective intent and desire to maintain 
privacy as to his unlawful agricultural pursuits.” Id. at 211.
Similarly, in Katz, the defendant manifested his subjective expectation of privacy by 
closing the door behind him while using a telephone booth. 389 U.S. at 347. This Court stated, 
“one who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits 
him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that his conversation is not being intercepted.” Id. 
at 361.
Here, Jardines manifested his expectation of privacy in the contents of his home by 
shutting his windows, blinds, and doors. (J.A. 3.) Like Ciraolo. Jardines’ conduct shields an 
area which he seeks to keep private, indicating his intent to maintain privacy within his home.
As in Katz, merely shutting the door behind oneself can manifest one’s intent to have privacy. 
Jardines’ affirmative conduct of shutting his blinds, windows, and doors clearly manifested his 
subjective expectation of privacy.
Moreover, even if Jardines’ actions are ambiguous, an expectation of privacy is presumed 
to apply to the contents of the home. United States v. Taborda. 635 F.2d 131, 138 (2d Cir.
1980). Citizens need not actively hide their conduct if they are in their home, “the very fact that 
a person is in his own home raises a reasonable inference that he intends to have privacy.” Id 
The sniff search was used to reveal objects within Jardines’ home which he subjectively intended 
to conceal, in an area where an expectation of privacy is presumed to apply.
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B. Jardines' Subjective Expectation of Privacy in the Intimate Details Within His
Home Is a Reasonable Expectation That Society Recognizes.
The second prong of the Katz test inquires into reasonableness of the expectation of 
privacy, “whether the government’s intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values 
protected by the Fourth Amendment.” Oliver v. United States. 466 U.S. 170,182-83 (1984). 
This Court has held that at the very core of the Fourth Amendment “stands the right of a man to 
retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.” 
Silverman v. United States. 365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961). Given the special place the home has in 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, “searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are 
presumptively unreasonable.” Pavton v. New York. 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). The attempt to 
reveal objects within the home without a warrant is a clear violation of the standard set out by 
this Court because “the Fourth Amendment draws ‘a firm line at the entrance to the house.’ That 
line, we think, must be not only firm but also bright—which requires clear specification of those 
methods of surveillance that require a warrant.” Id. at 590.
1. The sniff test intrudes beyond the firm line drawn at the entrance to the
home because drug dogs detect information from within the home that 
officers could not otherwise obtain without intruding into the 
constitutionally protected area.
This Court has been clear that the contents of the home are protected and that any breach 
of the right to privacy within the home is impermissible. Id at 584-585. In Kyllo v, United 
States. 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001), this Court addressed the issue of whether police, without a 
warrant, could use a thermal-imaging device to scan a private home to detect a heat signature 
similar to that put out by high-intensity lamps used to grow marijuana. After becoming 
suspicious that marijuana was being grown at Kyllo’s residence, police scanned the outside of 
the home with a thermal-imaging device, which showed a portion of the house was inordinately
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warm. Id. at 28. Police obtained a warrant using the information from the thermal-imaging
device and searched the residence, finding live marijuana plants inside. Id. at 27. After the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon denied Kyllo’s motion to suppress and the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, this Court reversed, reasoning:
[I]n the case of the search of the interior of homes—the prototypical and hence most 
commonly litigated are of protected privacy—there is a ready criterion, with roots deep in 
common law, of the minimal expectation of privacy that exists, and this is acknowledged 
to be reasonable. To withdraw protection of this minimum expectation would be to 
permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. We 
think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the 
interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical 
intrusion into a constitutionally protected area: constitutes a search—at least where (as 
here) the technology in question is not in general public use.
14 at 29.
The thermal-imaging detector was used to detect objects from within the home, which 
police could not otherwise obtain without intruding into the constitutionally protected area. This 
Court held a search occurred despite the fact that this search was conducted to determine whether 
drugs were present in the home. Id at 37. The use of the thermal-imaging detector was 
unconstitutional because it could be used to reveal intimate details within the home. Id. at 39.
Although police did not actually detect intimate details in this case, the mere possibility 
that police technology could be used for those ends was enough:
The Agema Thermovision 210 might disclose, for example, at what hour each night the 
lady of the house takes her daily sauna and bath—a detail that many would consider 
“intimate”; and a much more sophisticated system might detect nothing more intimate 
than the fact that someone left a closet light on. We could not, in other words, develop a 
rule approving only that through-the-wall surveillance which identifies objects no smaller 
than 36 by 36 inches, but would have to develop a jurisprudence specifying which home 
activities are “intimate” and which are not.
Furthermore, the fact that the heat signature the police sought to detect was permeating 
from the home was immaterial. This Court was concerned advancing technology would 
effectively allow police to enter the constitutionally protected area, “leav[ing] the homeowner at 
the mercy of advancing technology—including imaging technology that could discern all human 
activity in the home.” Id. at 35-36. This Court articulated the clear rule, that “obtaining by 
sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not 
otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ 
constitutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question is not in general public 
use.” Id at 34.
While drug detection dogs do not involve complex circuitry like the thermal-imaging 
detector in Kvllo. they do represent a tool that has been refined over centuries that police use to 
obtain information regarding the contents of the home that they otherwise could not without 
physical intrusion into the home. Although golden retrievers are in general public use, highly 
trained drug detection dogs with years of experience are hardly commonplace. (J.A. 26.) 
Furthermore, this Court stated in Kvllo that the defendant had an expectation of privacy in his 
home despite the presence of contraband. Id at 39. Jardines has a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in the intimate details within his home notwithstanding the presence of marijuana.
Similarly, in United States v. Karo. 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984), police used technology to 
track the location of a can of ether, which was being used to extract cocaine from clothing.
Police used a beeper monitor to track the marked can inside of the defendant’s house, and 
obtained a warrant to search the house based in part on information derived through use of the 
beeper. Id This Court held “[t]he monitoring of a beeper in a private residence, a location not 
opened to visual surveillance, violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a
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justifiable interest in the privacy of the residence.” Id. at 714. The fact that police could not 
have obtained that information without entering the house implicated the Fourth Amendment.
Id, at 706.
Here, the sniff search was a tool used to reveal the intimate details within the home that 
would otherwise be unattainable without intruding into the home. This is exactly what this Court 
sought to prohibit in Kvllo and Karo. In Karo, the beeper did not enhance the officers’ senses, 
like the thermal-imaging detector in Kvllo. nevertheless this Court determined a Fourth 
Amendment search occurred. This holding suggests the Fourth Amendment prohibits an officer 
from using tools to obtain details from within the home, not merely having their senses 
enhanced. Justice Stevens’ dissent in Kvllo noted that the rule this Court crafted inferentially 
must prohibit “the use of other new devices that might detect the odor of deadly bacteria or 
chemicals for making a new type of high explosive, even if the devices (like the dog sniffs) are 
‘so limited both in the maimer in which’ they obtain information and ‘in the content of the 
information’ they reveal.” 533 U.S. at 48. This Court should affirm its clear rule that police may 
not obtain information from within the home that they otherwise could not without intruding into 
the constitutionally protected area. This will ensure that police carmot invade a citizen’s 
foundational right to be free from governmental intrusion in their homes.
2. Jardines’ front porch is an area intimately tied to the home and should be 
afforded the same protections as the home itself
The front porch of Jardines’ residence is an area immediately surrounding the home and 
should be considered part of the curtilage of the home. The protection of the Fourth Amendment 
applies to citizens in their ‘‘persons, houses, papers, and effects.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence includes protection for the curtilage of the home, which is defined as 
“the area immediately surrounding a dwelling house.” United States v. Dunn. 480 U.S. 294, 300
(1987). Whether an area immediately surrounding the home is considered part of its curtilage is 
determined by a four factor test: (1) the proximity of the area to the home; (2) whether the area is 
within an enclosure surrounding the home; (3) the nature and uses to which the area is put; and 
(4) the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by passersby. Id at 295. 
These factors aid in the determination of “whether the area in question is so intimately tied to the 
home itself that it should be placed under the home’s ‘umbrella’ of Fourth Amendment 
protection.” Id. at 301.
For example, in Dunn, the defendant sought to suppress evidence that police obtained 
from the bam located approximately sixty yards from his home. Id In rejecting the defendant’s 
claim that the bam laid within the curtilage of his home, this Court applied the four-factor test:
The bam was located 50 yards from the fence surrounding the house and 60 yards from 
the house itself . . . [the] bam did not lie within the area surrounding the house that was 
enclosed by a fence . . . law enforcement officials possessed objective data indicating 
that the bam was not being used for intimate activities of the home . . . [And] 
respondent did little to protect the bam area from observation by those standing in the 
open fields.
Id at 302.
This Court concluded that the barn’s remote location rendered it not so intimately tied to 
the home itself to be considered part of the curtilage of the home. Id at 301.
On the other hand, in State v. Reinier. 628 N.W. 2d 460, 467 (la. 2001), the Iowa 
Supreme Court held that when officers approached Reinier's house and knocked on the front 
door that entry into the porch area by police constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment. 
The court reasoned that “[t]he porch of Reinier's house was just like any other portion of her 
house. It had glass-encased windows covered with blinds. The entrance to the porch had a solid 
wood door with a deadbolt lock and a screen door. Id. at 467.
Here, like Reinier. police came onto Jardines’ front porch, an area that physically touches
his home. Although Jardines’ porch did not have glass-encased windows covered with blinds, 
Ihe front porch is attached to his home, satisfying the proximity element of the Dunn test. On 
balance, existing precedent may not indicate a porch warrants the same protection as the interior 
of the home, however, extending protection to the porch, at least where police intend to conduct 
a search, would curtail exploitive and unreasonable police probes not related to the traditional 
knock and talk.
3. Officer Bartelt and his drug detection dog did not have an implied 
invitation to conduct a search on Jardines’ front porch.
While police officers and other members of the public may have an implied invitation to 
knock at a citizen’s front door or deliver a package, this general permission does not include an 
invitation to bring a drug detection dog onto the property to conduct a sniff search. The concept 
of an implied invitation exists because “[ijn the course of urban life, we have come to expect 
various members of the public to enter upon such a driveway, e.g., brush salesmen, newspaper 
boys, postmen. Girl Scout cookie sellers, distressed motorists, neighbors, fnends.” State y. 
Corbett. 15 Or. App. 470, 475 (Or. Ct. App. 1973). An implied invitation is limited, and “where 
it exists, [the invitation] extends only to those areas of the property that would be used when 
approaching the residence in an ordinary attempt to speak with the occupants.” Robinson v. 
Com.. 45 Va. App. 592,611 (Va. Ct. App. 2005).
For example, in State v, Ridgwav. 57 Wash. App. 915,917 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990), 
deputies walked around a closed gate and up a drive to the defendant’s house where they 






the police did not have an implied invitation to come onto his property and that the information 
police obtained could not be used to show probable cause for a warrant. Id at 918.
Here, Officer Bartelt and the drug detection dog came onto the property for the express 
purpose of searching for narcotics. An implied invitation exists only where citizens would 
reasonably allow persons to enter their property. Because citizens would neither expect nor 
permit a police officer with a drug detection dog onto their property, there was no implied 
invitation.
4. The plain view exception does not apply to objects concealed within the 
home that are undetectable to an officer’s unenhanced five-senses.
It is axiomatic that “police cannot reasonably be expected to avert their eyes from 
evidence of criminal activity that could have been observed by any member of the public.” 
California v. Greenwood. 486 U.S. 35, 41 (1988). Failure to obstruct methods of detection that 
enhance the human senses to uncover the intimate details within the home, which are not in plain 
view, does not render a reasonable expectation of privacy null. Taborda, 635 F.2d at 138.
For example, in Taborda. police used high-powered telescopes from 190 feet to detect 
activities occurring within the home, which would have been undetectable to the unaided eye.
Id. at 139. The court held “[t]o the extent, however, that the agents used the telescope to identify 
objects or activities that were not identified without an instrument, those observations were 
improper without a search warrant and could not form the basis for issuance of a warrant.” Id at 
139.
Similarly, in Kvllo. police used a thermal-imaging detector to uncover activities not in 
plain view. 533 U.S. at 27. This Court stated “that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology 
any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained
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without physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a search ” Id. at 34 
(citations omitted).
Conversely, in Greenwood, police legally obtained information from the defendant’s 
garbage can, which he had placed out on a public sidewalk. 486 U.S. at 37. This Court held that 
respondents “exposed their garbage to the public sufficiently to defeat their claim to Fourth 
Amendment protection.” Id at 40. Respondents exhibited their lack of an expectation of 
privacy by knowingly discarding their property where it was exposed to the public and for the 
express purpose of conveying it to third party trash collectors. Id at 41. Hence, conduct and 
information that persons knowingly expose to the public are not protected under the Fourth 
Amendment. Id
Here, as in Taborda and Kvllo. the government used a tool to expose information within 
the home which would otherwise be undetectable to police. Like Kvllo, where police used a 
thermal-imaging detector to reveal an otherwise invisible heat signature, the use of a drug 
detection dog allows officers to detect what would otherwise be undetectable to the officers 
themselves. 533 U.S. at 34. Where such scant quantities are emanating from the home that 
officers cannot detect them with their five-senses, using a tool that can detect them does not 
render the object in plain view. Id The government contends that the search is justifiable 
because drug detection dogs are detecting the scent of particles emanating from the home. (J.A. 
26.) The holdings in Kvllo and Taborda stand for the proposition that a search occurs whenever 
police use tools to detect information from within the home that the officers themselves could 
not have detected with their own five-senses. Although the record shows that detective Pedraja 
detected the scent of marijuana, he did so only after the unconstitutional search. (J.A. 27.)
C. The Federal Sniff Search Cases Are Inapplicable to the Home Because Those
Searches Occurred in Public Places Where the Objects of the Search Had Already
Been Seized.
The three federal sniff test cases this Court has ruled on are distinguishable from sniff 
searches conducted at private residences. Each of the cited searches occurred in a public place, 
involved a government need to regulate public safety, and was conducted only after government 
agents had apprehended the object of the search. S^ United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 
(1983); City of Indianapolis v. Edmond. 531 US. 32, 43 (2000); Illinois v. Cabajl^, 543 U.S. 
405,409 (2005). In contrast, citizens’ expectations of privacy are at their highest in their homes, 
the government has no special interest in regulating conduct within homes, and citizens are less 
anonymous in their homes than in public places. Silverman. 365 U.S. at 511.
First, in Place, this Court addressed the issue of whether police, based on reasonable 
suspicion, could temporarily seize a piece of luggage at an airport and then subject the luggage to 
a sniff test by a drug detection dog. 462 U.S. at 701. Police became suspicious of Place s 
behavior at the departure airport and seized his luggage, then subjected it to a sniff test by a drug 
detection dog at the arrival airport, where they found cocaine. Id at 698. This Court mled that a 
dog sniff test does not implicate the Fourth Amendment when conducted on luggage that has 
been seized at an airport based on reasonable suspicion of unlawful activity, where the luggage 
has been separated from its owner and the sniff test is conducted in a public space. Id at 707.
This Court reasoned that although a person possesses a privacy interest in the contents of 
personal luggage, because the search was conducted in a public place and the search was 
minimally invasive, the sniff test did not constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. Id Because citizens have a lower expectation of privacy in public places and the
search did not involve an officer rummaging through the luggage, the search was permissible.
Id
This Court also addressed the permissibility of sniff tests on vehicles using public 
roadways. In Edmond, this Court addressed whether police may conduct a sniff test on the 
exterior of the vehicle stopped at dmg interdiction checkpoint. 531 U.S. at 35. In upholding the 
sniff test, this Court reasoned that the action was allowable because “an exterior sniff of an 
automobile does not require entry into the car and is not designed to disclose any information 
other than the presence or absence of narcotics.” Id at 40.
Similarly, in Caballes, this Court addressed the issue of whether police may conduct a 
sniff test on the exterior of a vehicle during a lawfiil traffic stop. 543 U.S. at 409. Adopting 
similar reasoning to the other sniff test cases, this Court ruled that the sniff test was permissible, 
stating “a canine sniff by a well-trained narcotics-detection dog [i]s 'sui generis' because it 
‘discloses only the presence or absence of narcotics, a contraband item.’” Id
The justifications for sniff tests conducted on vehicles and luggage seized in public 
places are less forceful when applied to citizens’ homes. First, while the government has a 
special interest in regulating passenger safety for airlines and roadways, no such justification 
applies to private residences. Id at 407. When citizens travel today, they may be subjected to 
full-body imaging scans, x-ray scans of their luggage, or sobriety checkpoints. The 
government’s traditional need to ensure passenger safety in airports and on roadways justifies the 
diminished privacy experienced by citizens. Id In contrast, it would be patently unreasonable to 
subject citizens’ homes to such procedures where no such justification exists. Thus, the 
government’s need to regulate public safety causes a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy 
to be lower when travelling than when in one’s home.
Second, extending sniff tests to the home undermines the special protection this Court has 
recognized for homes. Unlike a search conducted in an airport or roadway, the present search 
was conducted on the porch of a private residence. (J.A. 5.) This Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence recognizes a man’s basic right to retreat into his home and guaranties protection of 
the intimate details within it. Silverman. 365 U.S. at 511.
Finally, searches of the home are more intrusive because homeowners are subjected to a 
higher degree of public humiliation. While a person is essentially anonymous in an airport or in 
his vehicle, neighbors and pedestrians are likely to recognize and associate a person with his 
home. The spectacle created by the officers, DEA agents around the perimeter, and a police dog 
sniffing at a person’s front door is qualitatively different than a search conducted in a public 
place. The scale of the effort implicates the Fourth Amendment guarantee of freedom from 
unreasonable government intrusion.
1. The false positives study cited in Caballes undermines the government’s 
sni generis justification.
The justification that drug dogs alert only to the presence of narcotics is undermined by 
the false positives study cited in Justice Souter’s dissenting opinion in Caballes, “a study cited by 
Illinois in this case for the proposition that dog sniffs are ‘generally reliable’ shows that dogs in 
artificial testing situations return false positives anywhere from 12.5% to 60% of the time, 
depending on the length of the search.” 543 U.S. at 412.
This analysis suggests that sniff tests are like the technology used in Kyllo because they 
may also detect lawful activity. 533 U.S. at 29. Inferentially, if a drug detection dog mistakenly 
alerts to the presence of narcotics, it has detected and alerted to lawful scents. Being that 
thermal-imaging detectors were impermissible because they could be used to detect “at what 









to a constitutional violation. Id. In Kvllo. it was not that police actually detected lawful activity; 
rather, the mere possibility that thermal-imaging detectors could be used to detect lawful activity 
resulted in a constitutional violation. Id, Given that citizen’s homes will invariably contain 
lawful scents that sniff tests may falsely alert to, the justification that sniff tests will only detect 
the presence contraband should not be accepted. Id at 409.
2. The illegality of the object of the search should not preclude the
application of the Fourth Amendment because this approach would lead to 
an arbitrary and discriminatory use of government action.
The Fourth Amendment requirements of reasonableness and probable cause were 
intended to impose standards upon the exercise of discretion by government officials, including 
law enforcement agents, in order “to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against 
arbitrary invasions.” Delaware v. Frouse. 440 U.S. 648.653-54 (1979). The central purpose was 
the prevent indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of “general 
warrants.” Payton, 445 U.S. at 584.
A standard declaring searches that reveal only illegal conduct per se legal abrogates the 
central purpose of preventing police from employing the search in an arbitrary or discriminatory 
marmer. Prouse. 440 U.S. at 653. Police will be able to search every citizen’s house, apartment, 
or locker with impunity. This blanket allowance undercuts the protections citizens have come to 
expect in their homes and creates the incentive for police to develop more technologies that 
“only” detect illegal activity.
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II. A LAWFUL FOURTH AMENDMENT SNIFF SEARCH REQUIRES AN 
APPROPRIATE EVIDENTIARY SHOWING OF PROBABLE CAUSE.
A. Probable Cause Is the Per Se Evidentiary Standard for Any Fourth Amendment
Search.
The Fourth Amendment states, “no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const, amend IV. In Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98,
100-02 (1959), this Court defended the legal philosophy behind the presumption that a breach of
the Fourth Amendment requires probable cause:
The requirement of probable cause has roots that are deep in our history...That 
philosophy later was reflected in the Fourth Amendment. And as the early 
American decisions both before and immediately after its adoption show, 
common rumor or report, suspicion, or even ‘strong reason to suspect’ was not 
adequate to support a warrant. And that principle has survived to this day.. .It is 
important, we think, that this requirement be strictly enforced, for the standard set 
by the Constitution protects both the officer and the citizen.
This Court traditionally recognized that “in cases where the securing of a warrant is 
reasonably practicable, it must be used.” Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925) 
(warrantless search of a vehicle). The Carroll Court further held that, “in cases where seizure is 
impossible except without warrant, the seizing officer acts unlawfully and at his peril unless he 
can show the court probable cause.” Id. Thus, this Court recognized that when a Fourth 
Amendment search or seizure occurs, a search must be justified by either a judicially approved 
warrant or the existence of facts giving rise to probable cause. Id
This Court in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1,20 (1968), made clear that it would not retreat 
from its “holdings that the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval 
of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure.” Even though this Court carved out a 
significant exception to the probable cause requirement for searches in public for the protection
of police and public safety, this Court nevertheless maintained that underlying police conduct 
"'must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's general proscription against unreasonable searches 
and seizures” and that “the notions which underlie both the warrant procedure and the 
requirement of probable cause remain fully relevant in this context.” Id (emphasis added). 
This Court held that “officers up to today have been permitted to effect arrests or searches 
without warrants only when the facts within their personal knowledge would satisfy the 
constitutional standard of probable cause.” Id. at 37.
This Court, in Almeida-Sanchez v. United States. 413 U.S. 266, 287 (1973), held that 
“the ordinary rule is that to be reasonable under the [Fourth] Amendment a search must be 
authorized by warrant issued by a magistrate upon a showing of probable cause.” While this 
Court held that persons found at the border are subject to warrantless searches without probable 
cause, it also held that “away from the border, persons and automobiles may be searched for 
narcotics or other contraband only on probable cause.” Id at 295.
This Court in United States v. Ross. 456 U.S. 798, 807-08 (1982), held the traditional 
Carroll requirement of probable cause for warrantless searches to be good law under 
contemporary conceptions of Fourth Amendment protection. In Ross, this Court held that a 
search is “not unreasonable if based on facts that would justify the issuance of a warrant, even 
though a warrant has not actually been obtained.” Id at 809 (warrantless search of vehicle).
B. Exceptions to the Per Se Rule Require First That “Special Needs”^xist at the
Inception of the Search and Second That Public Interest Outweighs an Individual 
Interest in Privacy in the Context of the Search.
1. The traditional probable cause requirement for a warrantless search
demands “special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement.”
“Only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal 
need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable, is a
court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers.” New Jersey v. 
T.L.O.. 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985). This Court has echoed that rule in subsequent cases. See 
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n. 489 U.S. 602,619 (1989); Griffin v. Wisconsin. 
483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987). This Court has further held that exceptions to the traditional probable 
cause requirement for warrantless searches cannot be justified by the prevention of the 
destruction of potential evidence. Griffin. U.S. 392 at 29.
In Terry, this Court held that a “stop and frisk” search of a suspect who officers believed 
with a “reasonable suspicion” was about to commit a crime was justified by the “special needs” 
of law enforcement. 392 U.S. at 5. This Court held that police, in the line of duty, require the 
ability to pat down suspects for weapons when conducting investigations to ensure their safety. 
Id at 23. This Court did not intend for the rule established in Terry to be used in any manner 
other than police officers conducting “stop and frisk” searches for weapons that could be used to 
harm them or the public. Id This Court explained that “the sole justification of the search in the 
present situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, and it must therefore be 
confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other 
hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer.” Id at 29. In subsequent cases, this 
Court has upheld this limitation. See Dunaway v. New. 442 U.S. 200, 210 (1979) (limiting 
Terry to “on-the-street frisk for weapons”); Ybarra v. Illinois. 444 U.S. 85, 93-94 (1979) 
(holding Terry does not support “any search whatever for anything but weapons”).
The exception in Terrv “is not justified by any need to prevent the disappearance or 
destruction of evidence of crime.” 392 U.S. at 29. The Terry Court further explained that an 
officer “must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Id at 21.
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Thus the “special need” in this case is for the police to be able to maintain reasonable 
expectations of safety while doing their job, which is inherently dangerous. Terry does not apply 
to the case at hand. Police were not in any immediate danger when they conducted the search of 
Jardines’ home. In fact, their surveillance of his home indicated that Jardines was not at home. 
(J.A. 38.) Their belief that Jardines was not home destroyed any possibility that the public or 
officers were in any danger when the search was conducted. Moreover, if officers truly believed 
that they were in danger, they would not have approached the door without first calling for 
backup. The presence of a drug detection dog would not provide any protection against any 
physical danger that could be awaiting in a home. Thus it is, at worst, a reasonable inference that 
the officers did not reasonably believe themselves or the public to be in any immediate danger. 
Furthermore, this Court maintained that the need to prevent the destruction of evidence was not a 
“special need.” If expediting the investigative process was the “sole” reason that officers 
searched Jardines* home, they would have unlawfully abrogated his Fourth Amendment rights.
The Terry decision led to a series of subsequent cases in which this Court has held lawful 
warrantless searches of individuals without the traditional probable cause requirement being 
satisfied. In T.L.O.. this Court held lawful the search of a student without a warrant and without 
probable cause. 469 U.S. at 347-48. This Court held that maintaining safety for students in a 
compulsory public education system constituted a “special need.” Id at 351 -52. There is a 
“special need” because the government has taken responsibility for children through compulsory 
education. Id However, Jardines’ home is not comparable to a public school because it is not a 
venue that hosts children who are mandated to be there. The “special need” to protect children 
from danger and maintain a healthy learning environment does not extend to a private home. 
Children must go to school and are expected to get a good education, thus the need to protect
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them there is paramount. Private property, specifically Jardines’ home, is not a location at which 
children are required to be present for several hours throughout the day, thus the government 
does not have the same interest in promoting an enviromnent safe for children within his home. 
Indeed, it is reasonable for the government to abrogate an individual’s Second Amendment rights 
at a school, but that does not empower it to do the same at a private residence.
This Court has further applied the T.L.O. exception to vehicle stops conducted by police 
officers. See United States v. Sharpe. 470 U.S. 675. 696-97 (1985) (vehicle stop for police 
investigation with less than probable cause); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663 (random vehicle stop to 
check for driving documentation). The distinction between Sharpe and Prouse and the case at 
hand is that in the former cases, a “special need” to protect the public from potentially dangerous 
activity in driving cars on public roads satisfies the first prong of the test in Terry. Here, no such 
need existed. Police suspected a marijuana grow operation existed in Jardines’ home. (J.A. 8.)
A marijuana grow operation differs from a car on a public road in two ways. First, the vehicle is 
in public where it poses a danger to those around it. Id. at 658. Here, the marijuana was 
confined to the inside of a home where the public had no access to it. (J.A. 17.) Second, a car 
can cause serious harm to individuals should accidents occur. Id. Marijuana has no similar 
capacity. Marijuana confined in a house cannot explode, run into, kill or injure the public. The 
marijuana grow operation does not meet the Sharpe and Prouse requirement of a “special need.”
In other cases, this Court has held that highly regulated private locations constitute a 
“special need.” See New York v. Burger. 482 U.S. 691, 712-713 (1987) (inspection of highly 
regulated business location for compliance with regulations); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 
601-06 (1981) (inspection of underground mines for compliance with regulations); United States 







regulations). Highly regulated locations are special because their regulation is necessary to 
ensure public safety. Id. at 315. This line of cases is also distinguishable from the current case 
in that the area searched in the current case, the home, is not a highly regulated location. In 
Burger. Donovan, and Biswell, the government interest in ensuring compliance with safety 
regulations to promote public safety was so great that a “special need” existed and the 
government could point to a statute to support such a “special need.” Id. at 317. However, no 
such regulatory statute existed in this case. The “special need” must extend “beyond the normal 
need of law enforcement.” T.L.O.. 469 U.S. at 351. Thus the crux of the Burger. Donovan, and 
Biswell “special needs” exception is that the statutory regulations that the government cited in 
those cases were beyond normal criminal statutes. Instead, the statutes ensured compliance with 
regulations at highly regulated places by allowing searches with less than probable cause. This 
Court designated this, specifically, as a “special need” and one that is “beyond the normal need 
of law enforcement.” Jardines’ home is not regulated by a special statute and thus does not 
require the same type of compliance checks that the locations in Burger, Donovan, and Biswell 
did.
This Court has also recognized a “special need” in the regulation of the borders of the 
nation. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte. 428 U.S. 543. 566-67 (1976) (random inspection and 
questioning of aliens at the border). In Martinez-Fuerte. the location in which the search was 
conducted was both public and highly regulated. Id. at 554. The border presents an immediate 
and significant danger to national security, constituting a “special need.” Id. at 545. Jardines’ 
home is distinguishable from the border in that his home is not a public place, nor does it present 
a serious and immediate threat to national security.
26
#
The final area that this Court has recognized a “special need” is in cases involving 
previously convicted criminals. Bell v. Wolfish. 441 U.S. 520, 562-63 (1979) (cavity searches 
of prison inmates). A prison is both public in the sense that there is no expectation of privacy 
there and is the most regulated of the aboveraentioned areas. Id at 546. Furthermore, under a 
Terry analysis, searches of prison inmates in Bell helps correction officers perform their duties in 
relative safety. Id. at 547. In the case at hand, the record does not indicate that Jardines is a 
convict. Furthermore, his home is not public in the same sense that a prison would be 
recognized as public and is in no way regulated like a prison.
In the single instance in which this Court has allowed a search of a home with less than 
probable cause, it has required that “special needs” exist. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 880. In Griffin, 
this Court held that the warrantless search of a probationer’s home without probable cause was 
lawful. Id The Griffin Court held that an effective probation system necessitated the use of a 
lower evidentiary standard for searches of probationers’ homes to ensure that they are not 
recidivating and that the requirement of probable cause to conduct a search for contraband in a 
probationer’s home would be impracticable. Id at 873-74. But nothing in the record points to 
Jardines’ home being subject to the Griffin rule. The detectives in this case were not conducting 
a search of a probationer’s home and there is no government system or program that would 
necessitate the search of his home to ensure its efficacy. Griffin does not apply.
In the case at hand, the lack of a “special need” bars any weighing of public and private 
interests in determining the reasonableness of the search. A “special need” is necessary as a 
preliminary finding before any such balancing can occur. T.L.O^, 469 U.S. at 351. The lack of 
any facts indicating a “special need” “beyond the normal need for law enforcement”, thus ends 
any further inquiry into the Terrv test.
2. Even if the Court holds that a “special need” exists, the government
interests in the search do not outweigh Jardines’ reasonable expectation of 
privacy.
Only after a court finds that a “special need” existed that may necessitate a standard 
lower than probable cause may a court balance the interests of the public against the individual 
interest of privacy from a warrantless search. Id “Where a careful balancing of governmental 
and private interests suggests that the public interest is best served by a Fourth Amendment 
standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause” a search may be lawful in the 
absence of a warrant or probable cause. Id
In Terry, this Court carved out from traditional probable cause requirements an important 
safeguard for police and public safety. 392 U.S. at 1. Terry involved the warrantless search and 
seizure of an individual that police suspected was about to commit a robbery. Id at 5. The 
suspect was in public, loitering in front of a store in the middle of the night. Id at 5-8. The 
officer in the case did not possess the probable cause necessary to conduct a traditional search or 
seizure of the defendant. Id at 22. This Court nevertheless held that the stop and frisk was 
lawful as an exception to the traditional and still standing probable cause requirement for 
ordinary searches. ^ at 30. In doing so, this Court adopted a new test for allowing lawful 
searches of defendants in public in the absence of probable cause. The test first examines the 
“nature and extent” of the government interests involved. Id at 22. Second, the test looks to the 
“nature and quality” of intrusion of the search being conducted. Id at 24.
As to the first prong of the test, this Court recognized that police officers must maintain a 
reasonable expectation of safety while conducting their duties in public. Id at 23. This Court 
specifically pointed to the fact that a police officer, when conducting reasonable investigations of 
suspicious activity, must be able to do so with the knowledge that suspects are not armed and
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dangerous. Id at 23-24. This Court also pointed to the importance of ensuring that the public be 
kept safe from dangerous suspect activity. Id. at 31.
As to the second prong of the test, this Court determined that the search, while intrusive, 
was minimally intrusive and narrow in its “purpose, character, and extent”. Id at 25 (citing 
Preston v. United States. 376 U.S. 364,367 (1964)). This Court further held that a search of this 
type must be limited to weapons necessitated by “exigencies which justify its inception.” Id at 
26 (citing Warden v. Havden. 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967)). In Terry, the search was minimally 
invasive in that the officers only patted down the suspect’s pockets to ensure that he possessed 
no weapons. Id at 25-26. In that context, this Court allowed the search on less than probable 
cause because the government interest was so great that it outweighed the suspect’s individual 
expectation of privacy on a public street. Id at 23-31.
In the case before this Court, the first prong of the test is not satisfied. Detectives were 
not in any position where they would reasonably believe themselves or the public to be in 
immediate danger. Detectives in the case at hand argued that their initial surveillance of 
Jardines’ home indicated that nobody was home. (J.A. 38.) The only logical reason that the 
detectives wanted to conduct the search without a warrant and without probable cause was to 
expedite their investigation and ensure that no evidence was destroyed as a result. However, the 
Terry Court specifically stated that this was not a sufficient reason for conducting a warrantless 
search in the absence of probable cause. Id Thus the government interest in the case at hand 
does not weigh heavily in its favor.
Jardines, though, presumptively carries a significant expectation of privacy within his 
home. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution reads: “The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not
be violated.” U.S. Const, amend. IV. Houses are specifically enumerated locations that the 
Constitution protects in the Fourth Amendment. Id. This Court has given this fact significant 
weight in cases involving warrantless searches of homes.
In Coolidee v. New Hampshire. 403 U.S. 443, 451 (1971) (citing Jones v. United States. 
357 U.S. 493,497 (1958)), this Court held that "belief, however well founded, that an article 
sought is concealed in a dwelling house, furnishes no justification for a search of that place 
without a warrant. And such searches are held unlawful notwithstanding facts unquestionably 
showing probable cause.” This Court has always maintained that “the Fourth Amendment 
protects the individual’s privacy in a variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more 
clearly defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical dimensions of an individual’s 
home—a zone that finds its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms.” Payton, 445 U.S. at 
589-90. “At the very core stands the right of a man to retreat into his own home and there be 
free from unreasonable governmental intmsion.” Silverman, 365 U.S. at 511. “The Fourth 
Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house. Absent exigent circumstances, 
that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.” Payton, 445 U.S. at 590.
Because Jardines was in his home, his expectation of privacy was at its height. His 
interest in being free fi'om government intrusion at his home is not only subjectively expected, 
but is constitutionally enumerated and diligently guarded by the courts. The first prong of the 
test fails to favor the government because the interests of the government are minimal while 
Jardines’ interests in privacy are paramount.
Even if this Court finds that the government has a significant interest in the search of 
Jardines’ home, that interest does not outweigh Jardines’ individual expectation of privacy.
First, the search in Terry was public, where one is already visible to the public and has waived
his presumptive expectation of privacy in his home. Police never physically penetrated a private 
residence to conduct the Terrv search, which as this Court has indicated in its precedent, is a
serious government intrusion. See Silverman. 365 U.S. at 511. Second, the Terry Court held 
that the search of the suspect was minimally intrusive because officers only patted down the 
suspect’s outer pockets for weapons. Terrv. 392 U.S. at 24. However, this Court did 
acknowledge that even in that instance, the search was an “annoying, frightening, and perhaps 
humiliating experience.” Id. The presence of police and a drug detection dog at a private home 
constitutes an even more “annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating” experience in that the 
individual’s neighbors, friends, and family are likely present to observe the intrusion. The 
embarrassment of a search in the presence of one’s acquaintances is far more intrusive than one 
in the presence of strangers in public because after the search an individual must continue to 
interact with those he knows. The impact of the search lasts far longer, as a result. The 
invasiveness of the search of Jardines’ home, thus, is far more significant than that in Terry and 
is enough to support a finding in his favor.
The search of Jardines’ home is not justified by a “special need.” Even if this Court 
holds that there was a “special need”, Jardines’ individual expectation of privacy far outweighs 
the government’s minimal interest in the search. Because the search does not meet the Terry 
standard for an exception to the probable cause requirement for a search, probable cause must be 
the evidentiary burden for the search at Jardines’ home.
3. Officers did not possess probable cause to search Jardines’ home.
In Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 217 (1983), this Court resolved the question of whether 
an informant tip was sufficient evidence to support probable cause. This Court held that the tip 
from an informant was sufficiently detailed and corroborated by police surveillance and
investigation to support a finding by the reviewing magistrate of probable cause. Id at 245-46. 
This Court adopted a “totality of the circumstances” test in determining whether or not a tip was 
sufficient for establishing probable cause in an investigation. Id. at 230-31. The credibility of 
the tip should be viewed in light of all of the other evidence collected throughout the course of 
the police investigation. Id.
The case at hand does not meet the standard set forth in Gates to support a finding of 
probable cause. In Gates, this Court held particularly important the fact that the tip was from a 
police informant. Id at 230. Here, the tip implicating Jardines in the grow operation was 
anonymous. (J.A. 8.) Thus the tip in the present case was not inherently credible. In addition, 
the amount of police investigation leading up to the sniff search does not significantly improve 
the credibility value of tip. Officers observed for fifteen minutes that the blinds were closed, 
nobody came in and out of the house, and that the air conditioner was cycling throughout the 
surveillance. (J.A. 32.) The observations made by the police officers were too tenuous to 
establish inferences amounting to probable cause, even with the crime stoppers tip. Blinds being 
closed, the absence of foot traffic around the home, and the air conditioning running for fifteen 
minutes is so common an occurrence that an uncorroborated tip could establish probable cause to 
search any home with minimal surveillance. That low of an evidentiary burden on police would 
completely abrogate Fourth Amendment protections of the home and destroy “the right of a man 
to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable governmental intrusion.”
Silverman. 365 U.S. at 511.
C. Even if this Court Holds That the Search of Jardines’ Home Meets the Standard
for an Exception to the Probable Cause Requirement, this Court Should Require
Probable Cause for Public Policy Reasons.
This Court’s fervent protection of Fourth Amendment rights has always stemmed from the 
fear of the “grave danger” of the abuse of discretion by police. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662 (citing 
Martinez-Fuerte. 428 U.S. at 559). This fear is justified by the logical conclusion that police 
have a significant and often perverse incentive to obtain evidence in criminal investigations 
regardless of the protections that the Constitution affords United States citizens. United States v. 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972). 
Police officers are lauded for their ability to arrest suspected criminals and their job performance 
is often measured on that ability. Such incentives must be checked by the judiciary to ensure that 
the harms of the “annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience” of a search at one’s 
home are not arbitrarily experienced. Terry. 392 U.S. at 24. In allowing officers to use a low 
standard to conduct sniff searches, this Court would be granting officers the authority to search 
homes with almost no evidence.
The impact of that policy, combined with police incentives to arrest the most suspects 
would lead to an Orwellian dystopia. The combination could lead to police officers fabricating 
surveillance information because the evidentiary standard is so low that there would be no way 
of knowing whether the surveillance was real or not. If the facts of the case at hand are to be 
used as an example, any person who, for fifteen minutes, leaves their air conditioning rutming, 
has their blinds closed, and who does not enter or exit their home would be subject to a search if 
police “hear” from an uncorroborated source that he may be conducting illegal activity in the 
home. Police could freely approach homes and conduct sniff searches with all of the 
embarrassing harms described in Terry with minimal surveillance. This Court would be
condoning the presence of police on comers of every street with drug detection dogs on the leash 
ready to sniff homes at the first sign of suspicious activity. This type of policy seems to be the 
exact type of harm the Fourth Amendment seeks to prevent.
Furthennore, if this Court were to rule in favor of Jardines, it would be encouraging better 
police work which would yield significant benefits. In the inevitable event that police were to 
abuse this Court’s ruling should it rule in favor of the State of Florida, appellate courts would be 
confronted with the problem of having to review a plethora of cases in which appellants would 
argue that the lower evidentiary standard was abused by officers investigating their cases. 
Invariably, many of those cases would either prove to have not met the evidentiary burden set 
forth by this Court or would prove to be based on fabricated evidence as described above. If that 
is the case, this Court would have to vacate the judgments of those who should be in prison for 
crimes they committed. United States v. Leon. 468 U.S. 897, 973-74 (1984).
In addition, if drug trafficking really does go hand in hand with gun possession, as this 
Court has accepted in a variety of cases, then this Court should be encouraging cautious police 
investigation of that criminal field. S|^ Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993); Watson v. 
United States. 552 U.S. 74 (20071: Muscarello v I Inited States, 524 U.S. 125(1998). The use of 
a drug detection dog is not going to protect officers from being shot if they approach the door of 
a “dangerous” grow operation with the intent to conduct a search. Instead, officer safety is best 
maintained by requiring officers to conduct due diligence by conducting sufficient surveillance 
of the scene such that he knows whether or not firearms are likely to be in the house. Lowering 
the evidentiary burden encourages just the opposite. Officers will approach the door without 
conducting sufficient surveillance to ensure no weapons are inside and more will get injured or 
killed in the line of duty as a result.
CONCLUSION
The courts have traditionally recognized the significance of the home in every 
American’s ability to fully exercise his Fourth Amendment rights to the fullest. This Court has 
diligently guarded the private individual against government intrusion into the home. This Court 
should affirm the Florida Supreme Court decision because the use of a drug detection dog at a 
home is a search under the Katz test. Further, because the search does not comport to the 
probable cause exception requirements, probable cause must be the evidentiary standard used to 
conduct a dog sniff search at a home. Detectives’ lack of probable cause here warrants a 
judgment in favor of Jardines.
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